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Substantial amounts of debt relief have been granted to a set of low-income countries, 
as an alternative aid modality. Although the theoretical case for debt relief is firmly 
established, only empirical analysis can show whether debt relief is indeed a (more) 
effective mode of aid delivery. We investigate the linkages between debt relief and 
other fiscal variables such as current expenditure, government investment, taxation and 
domestic borrowing, in comparison to the effects of grants and concessional loans. We 
find that the fiscal impact of HIPC debt relief follows fairly complex dynamics. For 
example, debt relief initially reduces government investment, but the effect becomes 
positive after two years, well outperforming other modes of aid delivery.  
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The international community has recently embarked on an ambitious quest to trigger a 
substantial acceleration of economic growth and development. Ambitions are centred 
around an international consensus on a concrete, albeit broad, set of development goals, 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For low-income countries, documents 
such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) should translate these broad 
targets into country-owned development strategies. On the donor side, it has provoked a 
substantial redrawing of the overall aid architecture, at such a scale that some authors 
refer to it as a true paradigm shift (Renard 2006). Apart from the scaling up of aid, 
improving the effectiveness of aid is a crucial element of concern in this new paradigm.  
Traditionally, economists have tried to answer the aid effectiveness question using 
standard cross-sectional macroeconomic growth models, through the inclusion of aid 
flows as an explanatory variable. Perhaps not surprisingly, the results are inconclusive, 
reflecting the heterogeneous way in which aid is both given and used by different 
governments. More recently, especially since the World Bank Policy Research Report 
on Assessing Aid (1998), a new consensus seems to emerge. If aid is given to countries 
characterized by good governance, there is a positive impact on economic growth (Van 
de Walle and Johnston 1996; Burnside and Dollar 2000). This seems to confirm that, as 
in Franco-Rodriguez, Morrissey and McGillivray (1998: 1242), 
the core deficiency of this ‘aid-growth’ literature is that it fails to recognize 
explicitly that aid is given primarily to the government, and that hence any 
impact of aid on the economy will depend on government behaviour, in 
particular how fiscal decisions on taxation and expenditure are affected by aid 
revenues.  
During the last decade, debt relief has slowly made its way as an important element of 
the international ‘financing for development’ agenda, through initiatives such as the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. It is important to note that these debt 
relief initiatives fit nicely into the new aid architecture and the aid effectiveness debate: 
since debt relief to low-income countries is almost exclusively for debt owed to official 
creditors, these creditors are the same as those that provide (traditional forms of) aid to 
those countries. As such, debt relief is just one of the instruments of donor intervention 
(Berlage et al. 2003). So the crucial question is to what extent, and under which 
circumstances, i.e., debt relief a more promising instrument than the more ‘traditional’ 
modes of aid delivery (project aid, programme aid, technical assistance, etc.).  
A large theoretical literature discussing arguments both in favour and against debt relief 
has since evolved (see, e.g., Cassimon and Vaessen 2007). Although these theoretical 
arguments are now fairly well-established, the extent to which they are valid in practice 
ultimately remains an empirical issue. One powerful tool to analyse the issue is to look 
at the recipient government’s fiscal response behaviour on donor interventions on the 
debt relief type, as is done in so-called ‘fiscal response’ models. These models focus on 
the interactions between several categories of public expenditure and domestic and 
foreign revenue. More specifically, they look at the recipient government’s response to 
aid flows in terms of the decisions between various sources of revenue like taxation and 
domestic borrowing and areas of expenditure like public investment and recurrent 
government expenditure. Starting from the seminal Heller (1975) study, research  
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focusing on the fiscal response of aid has developed into a huge literature.1 Although 
the importance of disaggregating aid is well established in literature (see, e.g., Mavrotas 
2002), the literature has largely disregarded the potential effect of debt relief as a 
separate aid category. This is rather surprising, as debt relief may be able to provoke 
fiscal response effects that diverge, and are perhaps more desirable than other aid 
interventions. In examining the cases of debt-ridden countries, the literature has 
definitely considered debt service as an important element in fiscal response behaviour,2 
and a few recent fiscal response studies (such as the recent synthesis study by Fagernäs 
and Roberts 2004 on Malawi, Uganda and Zambia) do discuss the impact of debt relief, 
but not as a separate (aid category) variable. As such, this paper aims to contribute to 
the literature by looking at the fiscal (response) effects of debt relief, relative to other 
donor interventions, for a panel of 28 heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) that have 
at least reached the decision point in the HIPC Initiative, and are currently receiving 
debt relief.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the 
hypothetical fiscal response effects of actual debt relief practices. Section 3 describes 
our empirical strategy using a panel vector autoregressive model and deals with data 
issues. The fourth section presents the estimation results and the last section concludes. 
2  Comparative fiscal response effects of (HIPC) debt relief 
As already indicated in the introduction, the theoretical (fiscal response) effects of debt 
relief are well established. In principle, debt relief frees resources in the recipient 
country government budget that can be rechannelled into other spending (or used to 
reduce the fiscal deficit), i.e., it creates ‘fiscal space’ (Heller 2005). As such, from a 
resource viewpoint, operations on debt relief are very much equivalent in nature to new 
(aid) money inflow, when the new aid is delivered in grant form through some budget 
support modality. However, these fiscal space effects may not be so considerable in 
practice. As shown in the literature (see, e.g., Cassimon and Vaessen 2007), the general 
principle that debt relief mobilizes resources for other uses is only valid to the extent 
that debt would have been serviced. Otherwise the fiscal space effect of debt reduction 
is virtual and mainly refers to an accounting clean-up of historical and future arrears 
accumulation. Real fiscal space equals to the share of debt service actually transferred in 
the absence of debt relief.3 
But fiscal response may be provoked in a more indirect way: an excessive debt burden 
can provoke a series of actions by the government, creating a vicious circle that can be 
                                                 
1   See e.g., McGillivray and Morrissey (2004) for a recent overview of this literature. A review of the 
fiscal response literature is also provided in an earlier version of this article (Cassimon and Van 
Campenhout 2006). 
2   Several studies (e.g., Pack and Pack 1993 for the Dominican Republic; McGillivray and Ouattara 
2005 for Côte d’Ivoire) conclude that the bulk of aid is allocated to debt servicing. 
3   This is sometimes referred to as the economic value of debt relief, i.e., the present value of all future 
debt service payments that would effectively have been paid by the debtor in the absence of debt 
relief, with present value ideally measured at an appropriate (recipient country) discount rate and 
allowing for (partial or full) default.   
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stopped only by reducing debt to a sustainable level. Excessive debt service might 
severely not only crowd-out spending on development priorities, but also provoke 
suboptimal fiscal and other government behaviour (e.g., excessive domestic borrowing, 
excessive inflationary financing, excessive taxation of some sectors in the economy) 
and lessen incentives for economic reform. As a consequence, both private domestic as 
well as foreign investors might be discouraged from investing in the recipient economy. 
This is generally referred to as the debt overhang hypothesis.4 Removal of debt 
overhang through debt relief may lead to a number of different fiscal response effects, 
such as an increase in public investment and, over time, through the impact on private 
investment and ultimately on higher economic growth, which may lead to increased 
domestic revenue mobilization in absolute terms.  
An additional response effect might be at play. Several studies have shown that a large 
part of aid fungibility referred to aid being used for debt servicing. Moreover, Birdsall, 
Claessens and Diwan (2003) show that donors are engaged in ‘defensive’ lending, 
providing relatively more aid to debt-ridden countries for the purpose of allowing them 
to keep current on debt servicing rather than for direct development purposes. Again, 
debt relief might remove many of the incentives for governments to engage in this kind 
of aid fungibility, and for donors to engage in disbursing aid for these ‘defensive’ 
purposes. Both cases may make all aid granted to the particular recipient country more 
effective.  
So far, empirical analysis has not focused on the factual fiscal response effects. Rather, 
the existing literature focuses on the effect of debt relief on outcome variables 
associated with aid effectiveness such as income (per capita) growth, poverty or private 
as well as public investment (as in Chauvin and Kraay 2005, for example). Our 
approach is much less ambitious in that we restrict ourselves to analysing the effect of 
debt relief on the fiscal sphere. In doing so, we are much closer to the literature that 
studies the fiscal response of governments. However, is explained later, we opt for a 
vector autoregressive (VAR) approach instead of the usual non-linear three stage least 
squares (NL3SLS). Furthermore, we also deviate from the fiscal response literature 
which is generally characterized by a case study approach in that we will look at a panel 
of countries.  
In this paper, we restrict our analysis to debt relief embedded into the HIPC Debt 
Reduction Initiative. In 1996, on top of debt relief practices by bilateral creditors 
embodied in the Paris Club, the HIPC Initiative pledges additional relief for a specific 
subset of low-income countries in a once-and-for all effort that should bring the HIPCs 
back to the level of sustainability, by reducing their debt to a common threshold debt 
level. The Initiative was enhanced in 1999, with threshold debt levels being lowered (in 
external terms, down to a present value (PV) of debt-to-exports ratio of 150 per cent; in 
fiscal terms down to a PV of debt-to-fiscal revenues ratio of 250 per cent).  
Currently, eight years down the road, 22 countries have fully completed the HIPC 
process, have reached the so-called ‘completion point’, and have received irrevocable 
                                                 
4   The seminal reference is Krugman (1988). A lot of authors question the negative strict causality 
between external debt and growth for low-income countries. Rather, an excessive external debt is one 
of the symptoms of the systemic development problem of these countries. As such, a lasting solution 
calls for systemic changes, including tackling institutional, political and other weaknesses, for which 
debt relief will also be a necessary ingredient.  
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debt stock relief down to the threshold level.5 Furthermore, another eight countries are 
somewhere halfway, implying that they have reached a decision point agreement when 
the amount of HIPC debt relief is determined (in principle). Also determined are 
additional conditionalities which the recipient countries must comply with in order to 
reach completion point. In the meantime, these countries receive so-called interim debt 
relief. About ten additional countries still have to fulfil certain entry requirements.6 
Overall, currently committed debt relief amounts to about US$33 billion in present 
value terms (IDA and IMF 2006). 
A detailed study and assessment of the HIPC Initiative is beyond the scope and purpose 
of this paper.7 However, it has been shown that the HIPC Initiative is more than an 
‘accounting clean-up’ operation leading only to ‘virtual’ debt relief. Partly due to the 
fact that also multilateral creditors (IMF, World Bank, regional development banks) 
reduced their claims, roughly half of total debt relief can be said to reflect real savings, 
available for additional priority spending. Moreover, this issue was acknowledged 
explicitly as it was determined in each country what part of the total HIPC debt relief 
had to be explicitly ‘budgetized’ (typically accounted for as grants in the recipient 
country budget), and its use is monitored separately. 
This brings us to the issue of response effects linked to earmarking, conditionality and 
monitoring, which is crucial in the case of HIPC debt relief. It is well known that the 
HIPC Initiative has come about with a heavy and diversified portfolio of conditionality, 
including not only broad macroeconomic and structural reforms through the 
conventional IMF programme, but also with broad poverty focus through the poverty 
reduction strategy papers (PRSP), and country-specific tracking mechanisms to monitor 
the use of HIPC debt savings. These tracking mechanisms range from counterpart funds, 
to virtual funds over comprehensive budget tracking.8 In all cases, donors want to make 
sure that the (real) fiscal space created is used for activities that target poverty 
reduction.  
All these features have specific fiscal response effects, most of them linked to limiting 
debt relief fungibility. In fact, viewed from a fungibility perspective, the general 
objective of the PRSP instrument, by emphasizing ownership, was not only to increase 
the focus on poverty reduction, but also to assure that donor and recipient country 
objectives coincide, eliminating the very basis for fungibility. Broad earmarking to 
actions indicated as priories in the PRSP allows the budgetized HIPC debt service 
savings to be used for a wide range of activities, from additional social sector and basic 
infrastructure spending, to reducing domestic debt, or merely reducing the fiscal deficit. 
Broadly speaking, donor (and recipient country civil society) monitoring is to make sure 
that governments are indeed using the resources for priority sectors, however defined, as 
                                                 
5  Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sao Tomé and Principe, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 
6  Furthermore, the extension of the so-called sunset clause up to the end of 2006 enabled some 
additional countries (Haiti, Kyrgyz Republic and Nepal) to qualify as a HIPC. 
7   See, e.g., Claessens et al. (1997) and Cohen (1996) for details of the rationale for HIPC, and e.g., 
World Bank (2004, 2006), Chauvin and Kraay (2005) for examples of preliminary detailed assessment 
studies.  
8  See, e.g., IMF and IDA (2001) for a comprehensive treatment.   
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determined in the PRSP, and reflected in the budget. But broad IMF programme 
conditionality (including the specific completion point triggers) has shown to be 
potentially restrictive in effectively using the fiscal space created. To give one example, 
Weeks and McKinley (2006), argue that in the case of Zambia, HIPC debt relief even 
had a negative effect on fiscal space, mainly due to expenditure and other ceilings 
coming from IMF programme conditionality.  
On the issue of the additionality of debt relief, and the impact on other donor flows, it 
has been witnessed that, although some short-term donor fungibility could be detected 
in some cases, clear signs of additionality have been witnessed from the year 2002 
onward at recipient country level, especially for post completion-point countries where 
net flows have indeed gone up more than the amount of debt reduced (World Bank 
2006).  
Although debt relief practices have not been limited to the HIPC Initiative, we prefer to 
limit our analysis to HIPC debt relief. One reason is that most of the pre-HIPC debt 
relief did not provide fiscal space, in the sense that most likely it did not lead to more 
resources being available in the budget in a cash flow sense, and, as such, fiscal 
response effects will have been extremely limited. The same applies to the debt 
overhang story: (repeated) small amounts of debt relief may not trigger a shift in the 
economy out of a low investment low growth debt overhang regime (Bulow and Rogoff 
1991). The final reason for limiting ourselves to HIPC debt relief is data availability. 
3  Model estimation, empirical strategy and data issues 
In this study, we do not confine ourselves to the timeseries data of one country, as is 
usual in the fiscal response literature. Instead, we derive our coefficient estimates from a 
panel of 28 HIPC countries. There are several reasons for this choice.  
First of all, note that the specific interest of this paper lies in studying the fiscal effects 
of debt relief, relative to other effects. Restricting ourselves to a single country would 
probably leave us with too little variation to adequately identify the effects of debt relief 
on other variables. A second reason is that timeseries data for developing countries is 
difficult to come by, and the quality may be questionable. Third, the aim of this paper is to 
look at the aggregate effect of a policy decision of the entire international donor 
community, namely that to grant additional debt relief to a set of countries, rather than the 
effect of an individual donor policy decision on a specific country. If we want to estimate 
the likely effects that debt relief has on the public finance of recipient countries in general, 
it makes more sense to look at the average effect of different countries than to try to 
extract information about these effects only from a certain country’s own history.  
3.1  A panel data VAR for fiscal response modelling  
Traditionally, fiscal response models are estimated in their structural form using non-
linear three stage least squares. However, it is well known that this method is extremely 
sensitive to the starting values. In this study, we follow Osei, Morrissey and Lloyd 
(2005) and estimate the fiscal response model in a VAR modelling framework. The 
rationale for this choice of econometric model is that fiscal aggregates are highly 
interlinked, and likely therefore to be endogenous (Fagernäs and Roberts 2004). In  
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addition, the VAR framework enables us to graph impulse-response functions, which 
provide a convenient way to evaluate the effect of a shock in one variable of interest on 
another variable of interest.  
The first model we estimate is a pooled VAR with two lags. This model does not 
control for unobserved country heterogeneity, but might provide a useful baseline case. 
Indeed, if there are time invariant individual effects, these will be absorbed in the error 
term, causing correlation between the explanatory variables and the residual.  Standard 
results for omitted variable bias indicate that, at least in large samples, the OLS levels 
estimator is biased upwards (Bond 2002).  
Hence, in a second model, we allow for unobserved country-specific means in the 
dependent variable by estimating a fixed effects (within groups) model.  However, it is 
well known that in short dynamic panels, the within transformation introduces non-
negligible correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the 
transformed error term. Nickell (1981) has shown that this correlation is negative. So, as 
a robustness check, a third model presents the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimates (Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen 1988; Arellano and Bond 1991), which are 
consistent for small T large N panels. For an elaborate account of the selection of the 
estimator, see Cassimon and Van Campenhout (2006). 
Since our panel is roughly square, it is not clear which estimation method is most 
appropriate for us. The fixed effects version potentially suffers from the correlation 
between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term 
mentioned above. However, the fact that our panel is roughly square also means that we 
are constrained in the number of instruments we can use. Since the system GMM 
method creates one instrument for each time period, variable and lag distance, using 
only t-2 as instruments would result in about 140 instruments, well above the suggested 
rule of thumb to keep the number of instruments smaller than the number of groups. In 
cases where the number of instruments is large relative to the number of observations, 
system GMM results are biased toward those of OLS. Given this, we feel that the 
efficiency gains from system GMM will be rather small, hence our preferred model is 
the fixed effects model on which we base the impulse response functions.  
Moreover, as in Osei et al. (2005), we also investigate the fiscal response of the 
different variables using impulse response functions. Impulse response functions can be 
used to graphically show the response of one variable of interest (for instance, 
government investment) to a shock in another variable of interest (for example, debt 
relief). More specifically, we will use orthogonalized impulse response functions, which 
allow us to answer such questions as: how does an innovation to external loans, holding 
everything else constant, affect government investment after three periods? To calculate 
the impulse response functions, we use the most popular approach proposed by Sims 
(1980), which involves a Cholesky decomposition to orthogonalize the shocks. 
3.2 Data  issues 
The model is estimated for a sample of 28 HIPCs that have reached at least the decision 
point status, and are receiving HIPC relief, either as interim relief, or, at completion 
point, irrevocable HIPC debt relief. For this sample, a database of fiscal variables is 
constructed by the authors, using data for these countries taken essentially from the 
budgetary data presented in IMF country reports, such as Article IV reports, the poverty  
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reduction and growth facility (PRGF) reviews, as well as HIPC decision and/or 
completion point documents. To the extent possible, data are gathered for the period 
1991-2004.  
The VAR model we estimate consists of seven variables. Most of the variables are 
standard in the fiscal response literature, only the dissagregation may vary. The first 
variable in the system is government revenue. This variable is both tax and non-tax 
revenue. It also includes, when relevant, oil revenues, profits from state-owned 
enterprises, etc. Next, we disaggregate government expenditure into current expenditure 
and government investment. Government current expenditure is net of interest payments. 
Government investment includes net lending. The fourth variable in our system is net 
domestic borrowing. We also decided to disaggregate external financing into external 
borrowing and external grants. Obviously, both loans and grants are net of any HIPC 
component. All HIPC relief, both loan and grant components, are in the last variable 
called debt relief. We estimate a VAR with two lags, as more lags would leave us with too 
few degrees of freedom, and experimentation showed further lags were generally 
insignificant. 
Before running the VAR, we choose to express the different variables in our system as 
percentages of GDP rather than using absolute amounts. There are different reasons for 
this option. First, it relieves us from having to convert the absolute figures into a 
common currency and to deflate them. Next, it also controls for the size of the economy. 
Furthermore, it removes unobserved effects that influence all countries and series in the 
same way as, for instance, the effect of the global economy. 
It is important to discuss the debt relief data derived for this paper somewhat more 
extensively. Debt relief, including the HIPC Initiative, cannot always be read immediately 
from the budgetary information provided by IMF reports, and different countries use 
different ways of accounting for debt relief in their budget (see De Groot, Jennes and 
Cassimon 2003 for a more detailed treatment of this issue). HIPC debt relief has two 
major components: multilateral and bilateral debt relief. The multilateral part is typically 
accounted for as a grant and is usually given as a separate budget line.9 Bilateral debt 
relief is often much more difficult to trace, as debt service is generally presented in the 
budget net of debt relief, without a separate budget line indicating the amount of debt 
relief embedded. However, within the framework of the completion-point triggers and the 
PRSP, IMF (and World Bank) usually track the actual granted amount of HIPC debt relief 
very closely, which means that total HIPC debt relief figures are available. As such, it is 
in general feasible to construct a variable that represents the total annual debt service 
relief resulting from the Initiative.  
4  A discussion of empirical results 
Table 1 reports on the fiscal response effects of the different variables in our system. As 
outlined above, we present three estimates of the VAR, one based on pooled OLS 
(panel A), a fixed effects VAR (panel B) and a system GMM VAR (panel C). Remember  
 
                                                 
9  As such, HIPC debt relief in the form of grants has to be deducted from the amount of aid given in the 



















           
  PANEL A: Pooled regression         
Government revenue  L1  0.773**  0.259** 0.164  -0.073  0.159* 0.149+  0.002 
 L2  0.116  -0.241**  -0.151  -0.053 -0.193*  -0.278**  0.038 
Current primary expenditure  L1  0.164*  0.741** -0.063  0.165  -0.216** -0.022  0.145** 
 L2  -0.103  0.200*  0.138  0.019 0.351**  0.151+  -0.162** 
Government investment  L1  -0.076  0.104 0.400**  0.106 0.034 -0.09  -0.072+ 
 L2  0.099  0.06  0.441**  -0.059 0.082 0.239**  0.048 
Domestic borrowing  L1  -0.058  -0.077  0.180* 0.164* 0.162** 0.225**  -0.014 
 L2  0.034  -0.002  -0.112  0.353** -0.146** -0.152**  0.004 
External borrowing  L1  -0.121  -0.142+ 0.117  -0.025  0.485** 0.202*  0.023 
 L2  0.127+  -0.017  -0.052  0.067 0.097  -0.149+  -0.025 
External grants  L1  -0.024  -0.057  0.229+ -0.054  0.015 0.640**  0.081+ 
  L2  -0.05  -0.065 -0.177 -0.018 -0.09  -0.002 -0.017 
Debt relief  L1  0.13  0.157  -0.351* -0.305  -0.292* -0.288*  0.780** 
 L2  0.137  0.036  0.522**  -0.171 0.363*  0.417**  0.007             
R²   0.89  0.82  0.86  0.27 0.65 0.8  0.61 
        
  PANEL B: Fixed effects regression      
Government revenue  L1  0.515**  0.203* 0.130 -0.094  0.072 0.237**  -0.018 
 L2  0.006  -0.177*  0.096  -0.065 -0.095 -0.051  0.047 
Current primary expenditure  L1  0.127+  0.525** -0.02  0.188  -0.192* -0.051  0.151** 
  L2  -0.135+  0.133 0.077 0.082 0.358**  0.071  -0.159** 
Government investment  L1  -0.148+  0.086 -0.005  0.139 -0.075 -0.233**  -0.055 
 L2  -0.004  0.084  -0.026  0.06 -0.084  -0.004  0.036 
Domestic borrowing  L1  -0.037  -0.128* 0.108+  -0.077  0.072 0.195**  -0.015 
 L2  0.044  -0.091  -0.105  0.156+ -0.189** -0.135*  0.006 
External borrowing  L1  -0.115  -0.253** 0.228* -0.128  0.369** 0.199* -0.02 
 L2  0.077  -0.163*  0.008  -0.039 0.005  -0.113  -0.047 
External grants  L1  0.136  -0.043  0.042 -0.134 -0.137 0.340**  0.056 
 L2  0.109  -0.171+  -0.082  -0.194 -0.157+  -0.09  -0.029 
Debt relief  L1  0.063  0.169  -0.314* -0.193  -0.432**  -0.282*  0.694** 
 L2  0.237+  0.017  0.438*  -0.370+ 0.176  0.286* -0.025 
           
R²   0.92  0.86  0.91  0.41 0.76 0.87 0.65 




Table 1 (con’t) 
All HIPCs 















           
  PANEL C: System GMM      
Government revenue  L1  0.604**  0.212 0.124  -0.342 0.119 0.222  -0.135 
 L2  0.092  -0.314**  -0.230+  -0.082 -0.329**  -0.337**  0.006 
Current primary expenditure  L1  0.173  0.777** -0.036  0.350*  -0.089 -0.086  0.173* 
 L2  -0.05  0.202+  0.341*  0.238 0.559**  0.146  -0.116+ 
Government investment  L1  -0.13  0.253+ 0.532** 0.283  0.247+ 0.1  0.001 
 L2  0.091  0.165  0.660**  -0.001 0.285*  0.462**  0.099 
Domestic borrowing  L1  -0.126  -0.215* 0.056  0.088 -0.047 0.119  -0.053 
 L2  -0.055  -0.125  -0.329**  0.342** -0.386** -0.307** -0.037 
External borrowing  L1  -0.261+  -0.297* 0.063 -0.236  0.401** 0.01  -0.046 
  L2  0.075 -0.042 -0.257 -0.092 -0.001 -0.284*  -0.096 
External grants  L1  0.171  -0.211  0.215 -0.158 -0.226 0.498**  0.092 
 L2  -0.092  -0.276*  -0.286+  -0.001 -0.332*  -0.302*  -0.014 
Debt relief  L1  0.244  0.218  -0.573* -0.572* -0.452* -0.239  0.748** 
 L2  0.399+  -0.124  0.422  -0.428 0.064 0.28  0.037 
Notes:   **,* and + denotes coefficient is significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.  
  All regressions include a constant, which is not reported.  
  The number of observations is 277.  
  L1 denotes lagged once and L2 denotes lagged twice.  
  System GMM estimate uses lagged levels dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments for the difference equations, and t-1 and t-2 for the levels equations. However, instead of 
creating one instrument for each time period, variable and lag distance, we only create one instrument for variable and lag distance to avoid that the number of 
instruments becomes too large (i.e., we use the collapse option in xtabond2). Estimation was done in Stata9.2 for linux, using the xtabond2 function written by 





That the pooled OLS model tends to overestimate the effects, while fixed effects tends 
to underestimate the effects. However, given the structure of our panel, we think the 
fixed effects model comes the closest to reality, so we focus the our interpretation on the 
results of panel B. Dependent variables are in the first row, explanatory variables 
(lagged once and twice) are in the first column. Since we are especially interested in the 
fiscal effects of aid, we concentrate on the lower half of panel B, which presents the 
impact of external borrowing, external grants and debt relief.  
4.1  Fiscal response effects on domestic revenue mobilization 
First of all, the results in Table 1 show that for this panel of HIPCs, only debt relief of 
the three different aid variables significantly affects domestic fiscal revenue (i.e., tax 
and non-tax revenue) and that this effect appears only after two years. An increase in debt 
relief appears to increase government revenue collection. The effect proves quite robust, 
as it shows up in both the fixed effects and the system GMM results. There is some weak 
support in the system GMM results that external borrowing reduces government revenue 
collection in the next year, but the pooled OLS results suggest this effect is countered by 
an increased effort to raise tax and non-tax income in the second year.  
Figure 1 
Fiscal response of selected variables to grants (○), loans (■) and debt relief (●) 
 
Source:  Impulse response functions, as computed by authors based on results in Table 1 (panel B).  
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Furthermore, there is also some evidence that government revenue responds positively 
to government current expenditure. Both the pooled OLS results and the fixed effects 
specification indicate that government domestic revenue collection increases the year 
after an increase in government consumption.  
Figure 1(a) shows the orthogonalized impulse response functions for the three aid 
variables for the all-HIPC fixed effects specification. The graph suggests similar effects 
of debt relief and grants on government revenue collection.  
How do our findings relate to earlier literature and our a priori hypotheses? It is clear 
that these results do not confirm the results from recent panel data studies such as Gupta 
et al. (2004) that witness a significant negative effect of grant aid on government 
revenue, and a positive one from loan aid. But a lot of individual fiscal response country 
studies do show mixed or insignificant results; as such, the results of our panel may 
highlight the different impact for different countries that leads to largely insignificant 
results. These finding seem to be validated by recent country-specific fiscal response 
studies that also highlight different country trajectories: Fagernäs and Roberts (2004) 
show that domestic revenue increased in countries such as Malawi and Uganda, but 
decreased in Zambia, irrespective of the type of aid. However, the observed fiscal 
response effect of debt relief seems to confirm our a priori hypothesis, predicting an 
increase of domestic revenues mainly in later years, due to debt overhang removal. 
Overall, individual country IMF documents, as well as country-specific PRSP progress 
reports seem to confirm this increasing trend in domestic revenue mobilization in recent 
years for HIPC countries.  
4.2  Fiscal response effects on recurrent primary spending 
Debt relief does not seem to significantly affect government primary consumption. 
Loans, be it external or domestic, appear to discourage future current primary 
expenditure, as predicted in the literature. There is weaker evidence that external grants 
also reduce government consumption, but this effect is only significant after two years. 
Furthermore, our fixed effects estimation results suggest that an increase in government 
revenue is followed by an increase in government consumption, but this effect is offset 
in the following year.  
Figure 1(b) shows the impulse response functions of the effect of the three aid variables 
on current primary expenditure. The graph clearly shows the discouraging effect 
external loans have on government consumption. Debt relief and, to a lesser extend, 
grants seem to increase government consumption over time. Again, this is largely in line 
with our a priori hypothesis on debt relief fiscal response. It also confirms recent 
observed trends on the evolution of public primary spending in individual HIPCs, 
related also to social sector spending. An analysis of individual IMF Article IV 
documents of the HIPCs as well as HIPC Initiative assessment studies (such as World 
Bank 2004) clearly shows that (mainly recurrent) social expenditures did go up 
significantly due to HIPC debt relief, leading in some but not all cases to increased 
primary expenditures. Thomas (2006) also shows that for a panel of low-income 
countries, debt relief manages to increase social spending more than grants.   
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4.3  Fiscal response effects on public investment  
Our next variable, government investment, is an interesting one, as in other fiscal 
response applications, this variable is thought to be central in linking aid to poverty 
reduction. Our fixed effects estimates suggest that aid in the form of grants does not 
affect government investment. Aid in the form of loans increases the share of GDP that 
goes to government investment. This is in line with earlier fiscal response studies.  
The effects of debt relief are particularly interesting. In the first year after receiving debt 
relief, government investment seems to decrease. However, this effect is more than 
offset in the following year, where a 1 per cent increase in debt relief as a share of GDP 
increases government capital expenditure as a share of GDP by 0.44. For the non-aid 
variables, domestic loans also encourage government investment, although this effect is 
less convincing, and the system GMM estimates suggest that this effect is offset after 
two years. 
Figure 1(c) shows the corresponding impulse response functions. It is interesting to see 
the difference between debt relief and external loans. While loans have a positive effect 
during the first two years, it becomes negative in the third year, and remains so for the 
rest of the time span. For debt relief, we observe the reverse. Government investment is 
reduced the first year following a debt relief shock, but from the next year onward, the 
effect is positive, and fairly large.  
The effect of debt relief is delayed, hinting at the existence of a J-curve effect. Again, 
this phenomenon is in line with our a priori hypothesis, again referring to debt overhang 
effects. It also confirms what is witnessed in a number of cases regarding the HIPCs, 
i.e., that most of the HIPC debt savings, especially early in the process, was spent on 
recurrent items, and less on investment outlays. 
4.4  Fiscal response effects on domestic borrowing 
When reviewing the fiscal response of aid categories in our panel, the only aid variable 
that affects domestic borrowing is debt relief. While the effect of a debt relief shock on 
domestic borrowing is clearly negative, our system GMM estimates find that this effect 
manifests itself a year after the shock—our fixed effects results suggest the effect is 
only significant at the second lag.  
Again, the debt relief response is in line with our stated hypothesis, hinting explicitly at 
the possibility of debt relief being used for domestic debt reduction. The fact that we do 
not observe any significant fiscal response effects for grant and loan aid also mimics the 
general results of earlier fiscal response studies, highlighting very mixed results when 
looking at different country experiences.  
4.5  Fiscal response effects of debt relief on other aid 
It is also interesting to look at the intertemporal interactions between the three aid 
variables. For instance, there is evidence that countries that receive debt relief are able 
to significantly reduce their external borrowing in the next year, providing support for 
the defensive lending hypothesis mentioned previously. In the fixed effects model, there 
is some evidence that debt relief reduces grants in the second year, but this negative  
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effect is offset in the next period. In any case, if we look at the system GMM results, 
debt relief appears to have no effect on aid in the form of grants. This is also shown in 
Figure 1(d), which shows the impulse response of the three aid variables on aid in the 
forms of grants. Indeed the response of grants to a shock in debt relief is initially 
negative, but is quickly offset. The response of grants to a shock in external borrowing 
mirrors the behaviour of debt relief. 
This result confirms what has been witnessed recently both for individual HIPCs as well 
as country sample analysis. HIPC Initiative updates (such as World Bank 2006) refer to 
the increase of official flows (other than debt relief) some years after HIPC, an 
observation also confirmed by Ndikumana (2004) in an econometric analysis. However, 
exceptions do exist, as seems to be the case for Zambia (Weeks and McKinley 2006).  
5  Conclusions and policy implications 
In this paper, we try to shed some light on the fiscal response effects of (HIPC) debt 
relief, relative to other forms of aid intervention. Since we are agnostic about the precise 
channels through which aid affects outcome variables, we do not measure aid 
effectiveness in terms of increased growth or poverty reduction, but confine ourselves to 
identifying the fiscal effects of granting aid. 
In doing so, we use recent advances in the fiscal response literature and study the impact 
of aid on fiscal variables in a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework as in Osei et al. 
(2005) and Fagernäs and Roberts (2004). We deviate from the case study approach that 
characterizes the fiscal response literature and estimate a panel version of the VAR, 
focusing on a panel of HIPCs. This panel approach allows us to draw conclusions and 
some preliminary policy consequences with respect to the ‘average’ fiscal response 
impact of a major debt relief initiative by international donor community, the HIPC 
Initiative, aimed at a group of debt-ridden countries. As the current debate in donor 
circles is concentrated very much on increasing aid effectiveness, and finding new aid 
instruments and modalities to achieve this objective, our results are potentially 
important for judging whether the use of debt relief as an aid instrument is superior to 
other aid instruments, and whether its use should be intensified.  
In our empirical research, we find that an increase in debt relief does not lead to a 
reduction in domestic government revenue collection. Furthermore, debt relief seems to 
perform better than grants or loans, especially in the longer run, as it seems to increase 
revenue collection. Also, debt relief seems to have no negative effect on the foreign 
component of recipient country revenues, i.e., future aid either in the form of grants and 
loans. We find that countries that receive debt relief are able to significantly reduce their 
external borrowing in the next year, which provides support for the defensive lending 
hypothesis. 
In line with the broad PRSP conditionality applied to HIPC debt relief, it can 
accommodate a broad range of more categorical fiscal response effects. While 
government consumption in general seems to be financed mainly through own tax 
revenue, non-tax revenue and grant aid, and external loans and domestic borrowing are 
typically more directed toward longer-term public investment projects, debt relief seems 
to affect all categories. Judged by the impulse response functions, debt relief seems to  
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encourage both recurrent and capital spending. However, in the later case, the effect is 
delayed, hinting at the existence of a J-curve effect, and providing some empirical 
support for the debt overhang hypothesis. Moreover, debt relief is observed to reduce 
domestic borrowing, more so than aid through grants or loans.  
However, we should use these quite positive, preliminary assessments with caution. 
First of all, the absolute level of (real) fiscal space that is brought about by HIPC debt 
relief is likely to be very small, particularly in comparison to grant and loan aid 
interventions, especially in countries that have massively defaulted on their debt in the 
recent past. Thus even though the effects are reasonably interesting in relative terms, it 
remains an open question if whether they result in a big (fiscal response) dent in 
absolute terms. 
The fiscal response effects of HIPC debt relief cannot necessarily be generalized in 
order to judge debt relief proposals for other type of countries (say, non-HIPC low-
income countries) or additional debt relief proposals for countries in similar 
circumstances, such as the 2005 Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), for 
example. As discussed in more detail in Cassimon and Vaessen (2007), different types 
of debt relief may bring about very different response effects. A few examples can 
quickly illustrate this. As noted in section 2, the difference in HIPC between the total 
amount of debt relief granted and the real fiscal space effect might be considerable 
because otherwise debt service is unpaid while in MDRI, the real fiscal space will be 
close to the debt relief granted on paper. On the other hand, in theory the indirect fiscal 
response effect on investment—because of the decreasing debt overhang—will not be 
so big, as it may already be realized largely through granted HIPC debt relief. For these 
reasons, in the discussion of appropriateness of new debt relief activities, it might be 
unwise to draw immediate policy consequences on these results without further more 
detailed and country-specific analysis.  
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